In a recent paper, Lo and Chau explain how to break a family of quantum bit commitment schemes, and they claim that their attack applies to the 1993 protocol of Brassard, Crépeau, Jozsa and Langlois (BCJL). The intuition behind their attack is correct, and indeed they expose a weakness common to all proposals of a certain kind, but the BCJL protocol does not fall in this category. Nevertheless, it is true that the BCJL protocol is insecure, but the required attack and proof are more subtle. Here we provide the first complete proof that the BCJL protocol is insecure.
a. Introduction Recently, Lo and Chau have made available on the quant-ph archives [10] a preprint that explains how to break a family of quantum bit commitment schemes, and they claim that their attack applies to the protocol of Brassard, Crépeau, Jozsa and Langlois [4] , hereafter called the BCJL protocol. The intuition behind their attack against the BCJL protocol is correct, and indeed they expose a weakness common to all proposals of a certain kind (including [1, 2] ), but the BCJL protocol does not fall in this category (see the opening paragraph in Section c). Nevertheless, it is true that the BCJL protocol is insecure, but the proof which we have known for quite some time [12] , is more subtle. Here we provide this first complete proof that the BCJL protocol is insecure.
We have also considered several variations on the BCJL theme. Neither Lo and Chau's attack nor the correct attack on the BCJL protocol explained below apply to these variations. One of these variations consists in having the photons travel in the reverse direction compared with the original BCJL protocol. This is natural for many cryptographic applications. Nevertheless, all these variations fail as well for different reasons related to subtle points in quantum information theory [8, 9] that only began to be understood at the time the BCJL paper was written. A proof that none of these variations work will be the subject of a forthcoming paper: the current paper focuses on the correct attack against the original BCJL protocol.
Lo and Chau wrote: "The security of other quantum cryptographic protocols say for oblivious transfer [...] remains to be examined." This is a serious concern because quantum oblivious transfer and many other quantum protocols depend on the security of bit commitment [3, 5, 19] . On the other hand, we disagree with the following sentence from Lo and Chau: "One might wonder if all of quantum cryptography may stumble under closer scrutinies" because our earlier proof of security for quantum key distribution [11, 13] would hold even if secure quantum bit commitment is not possible despite the fact that it is based on an earlier "proof" of security for quantum oblivious transfer that fails in the absence of a secure bit commitment scheme. The reason is that the proof of security for quantum key distribution does not depend on the security of quantum oblivious transfer, but rather on the (correct) proof that quantum oblivious transfer would be secure if implemented on top of a secure bit commitment scheme.
b. Bit Commitment Any cryptographic task defines the relationship between inputs and outputs respectively entered and received by the task's participants. In bit commitment, Alice enters a bit b. At a later time, Bob may request this bit and, whenever he does, he receives this bit, otherwise he learns nothing about b.
In a naive but concrete realization of bit commitment, Alice puts the bit into a strong- returns ok if if the bit b announced by Alice is accepted, otherewise T b returns not ok. The exact description of the function T b is irrelevant for our analysis. One does not need to understand in detail how the BCJL protocol attempts to realize bit commitment to see that it cannot work. The pair (C, r) corresponds to the information that is shared between Alice and Bob just before Alice sends the photons. Most of our analysis is done for (C, r) fixed, so (C, r) is suppressed in most of the notations. For instance, from here on, (C, r) is suppressed in the input of the functions T b (θ, c,θ,ĉ).
We denote p(θ, c|b) the probability of the state |c θ given the bit b that Alice has in mind.
Such a random distribution of pure states is called a mixture. The BCJL authors [4] explains that, given b, the results of any physical measurement whatever on the mixture prepared by Alice depend only on the density operator ρ b = θ,c p(θ, c|b) (|c c|) θ . This means that a dishonest Alice could send any other mixture {(|ψ , p(ψ))} such that ψ p(ψ)|ψ ψ| = ρ b , for some b ∈ {0, 1}, without being detected. It is correctly shown in [4] that such a strategy does not work. Their Theorem 3.7 implies that, for all practical purposes, any pure state |ψ commits Alice to a single bit b. More precisely, once Bob has received the n photons in a pure state |ψ , there exists one value b such that, except with a negligible probability, Alice cannot convince Bob that she had the opposite bitb in mind, that is,
is exponentially small. The conclusion in [4] is that the protocol is secure against Alice. However, as explained by these authors, preparing a mixture is not the only way to prepare a density matrix. Alice may prepare the density matrix ρ b of the n photons by introducing another system A kept on her side and preparing the new incremented system in a pure state |φ . Note that a pure state |φ of the incremented system is not in general the product of a pure state of A with a pure state of the n photons.
This possibility was considered in [4] . In the appendix of their paper, they mention the true fact that as far as the results of Bob's measurement is concerned, this alternative approach is equivalent to a preparation of a mixture by Alice. It is true that no matter what Alice does on her side, at the best, she will be found in a situation where everything behaves as if such a mixture had been sent to Bob. For any such a mixture, it is true that Alice may only open a single bit b. However, this is not sufficient to show the security against Alice.
The problem, which we explain in this paper, is that by delaying her measurement on the system A that she kept on her side Alice may choose the mixture and thus the bit b after the commit.
Let W be the input (θ, c,θ,ĉ) of the functions T 0 and T 1 . We consider W as a random variable. We denote W (0) the random variable W conditioned by b = 0 and W (1) the same random variable conditioned by b = 1. Both W (0) and W (1) refer to the honest protocol.
If the protocol is correct, except with negligible probability, we should have T b (W (b) ) = ok, that is, if Alice has been honest and has chosen the bit b, then Bob should accept it. The problem with the protocol COMMIT is that a dishonest Alice, by delaying her measurement, can choose after the commit to have W behave either as W (0) or W (1) . Let ψ be the classical after that Bob has executed his measurement on the n photons. However, these two measurements commute, that is, the random variable W is the same whether Alice measures before or after Bob, and the only thing that matters is the distribution of W . Therefore, we may assume that Alice measures before Bob. In such a case, the above condition says that after Alice's measurement the situation is exactly as in the honest protocol. Therefore, when the measurement M is chosen by Alice, we have W = W (b) , that is, W behaves as it would in the honest protocol when Alice chooses the bit b, and T b is expected to return ok. So Alice can cheat. In the remainder of this paper, we show that for all practical purposes, if the protocol is secure against Bob, then the above condition holds.
c. A simpler case This section considers the security of any bit commitment protocol in
which Alice commits herself to b by sending photons to Bob where the density matrices for b = 0 and b = 1 are identical. This is precisely the case that was independently considered by Lo and Chau [10] . This is sufficient to break the old protocol in [2] (which is not surprising since a simple EPR-type attack was already included in the same paper [2] ) as well as a more recent protocol proposed by Ardehali [1] . However, this analysis is insufficient to break the BCJL protocol since the density matrices ρ b prepared by Alice, when she has respectively b = 0 and b = 1 in mind, are not identical.
In fact, the main thrust of the BCJL paper was to prove that Bob could not cheat despite the fact that he was sent slightly different density matrices by Alice depending on which bit she wanted to commit to. (Clearly, the protocol could not be secure if the density matrices had differed too much, because then Bob would be able to distinguish between b = 0 and b = 1 without any help from Alice.) In this section, we show that the above mentioned condition holds under the simplifying assumption ρ 0 = ρ 1 . In the next section, we shall consider the situation that really applies to the BCJL protocol.
In the commit part, Alice prepares a pure state of the incremented system such that the density matrix for the n photons is ρ = ρ 0 = ρ 1 , that is, the same density matrix that would have been honestly prepared by Alice no matter whether she had b = 0 or b = 1 in mind. Now, let us assume that, after the commit, Alice wants to convince Bob that she had some bit b of her choice in mind. It is shown in [8] that by choosing the appropriate measurement on A, Alice may choose any mixture {(|ψ , p(ψ)} such that c p(ψ)|ψ ψ| = ρ. It is explained in [8] that when Alice chooses the mixture {(|ψ , p(ψ)}, she receives the classical outcome ψ with probability p(ψ) and, furthermore, the classical information ψ received by Alice uniquely determines the collapsed state |ψ of the n photons on Bob's side. In particular, Alice may choose {(|ψ , p(ψ)} to be the mixture {(|c θ , p(θ, c|b))}. We have that the classical information ψ received by Alice, which uniquely determines the collapsed state |ψ = |c θ on Bob's side, is (θ, c). This shows that the above mentioned condition holds.
d. The real situation Now, we consider the real situation in the BCJL protocol, where the density matrices ρ 0 and ρ 1 are not identical. We show that if the protocol is secure against Bob, then it is not secure against Alice. We must start with a necessary and natural criteria for the security against Bob. We use a criteria that makes sense for anyone who understands what it means to guess the value of a secret bit. Let X be the random variable which represents the best guess for the bit b chosen by Alice that can be made by Bob after the commit phase. Let b = b if and only if the bit chosen by Alice is b. The probability of error for this guess is P E = 1 b=0 Pr(b = b) Pr(X =b|b = b). Now, let ǫ = 1/25. The criteria is that, for a perfectly random bit b chosen by Alice, we must have |P E − 1 2 | ≤ ǫ. A probability of error close to 1/2 is is a natural criteria to indicate that one did not gain much information about a bit b that is initially perfectly random. We denote X b the random variable X conditioned by b = b so that Pr(X = x | b = b) = Pr(X b = x). The Kolmogorov distance K(p 0 , p 1 ) between two distributions of probability p 0 , p 1 on a set A is defined by K(p 0 , p 1 ) = x∈A |p 0 (x) − p 1 (x)|. Let p b (x) = Pr(X b = x). After some algebra, one obtains that the criteria |P E − 1 2 | ≤ ǫ implies that K(p 0 , p 1 ) ≤ 4ǫ. However, this inequality has been obtained for values of K that are defined in terms of measurements that return two outcomes, whereas the Kolmogorov distance K can be defined for an arbitrary number of outcomes. Let us show that, if the inequality K ≤ 4ǫ holds for any binary outcome measurement, the same inequality holds for an arbitrary measurement. It is shown in [6, 14] that the most general measurement on the n photons that is allowed by quantum mechanics can be described by operators M We define M ′ 0 = j∈A 0 M j and M ′ 1 = j∈A 1 M j . One may easily check that M ′ 0 and M ′ 1 define an incomplete measurement with a binary classical outcome. Let X be the random binary outcome of this measurement. We have that Pr(X b = x) = Pr(J b ∈ A x ). As desired we obtain:
Now, let us consider the Bhattacharyya-Wootters distance [7, 15, 18] It is explained in [15] that (1 − BW ) ≤ K/2. Therefore, we have BW ≥ (1 − 2ǫ). Furthermore, in [7, 18] it is shown that the minimum of BW over all possible measurement is the fidelity F between ρ 0 and ρ 1 . So, we have 1 ≥ F ≥ (1 − 2ǫ). A purification of ρ b is simply a pure state of the overall system that has ρ b for density matrix on Bob's side. A theorem due to Uhlmann [9, 16] says that the fidelity between two mixed states ρ 0 and ρ 1 is given by
where the maximum is taken over the purifications φ 0 and φ 1 of ρ 0 and ρ 1 respectively.
Therefore, there exists two purifications φ 0 and φ 1 such that
We describe Alice's strategy. Alice prepares the incremented system in the state |φ 0 .
Clearly, if Alice prepares the state |φ 0 , she can choose a measurement M (A) 0 that returns ψ = (θ, c) which will convince Bob that she had b = 0 in mind. Now, assume that Alice has prepared |φ = |φ 0 , but wants to convince Bob that she had b = 1 in mind. We show that the measurement M and Bob's measurement M (B) , both together, determine an overall measurement M 1 on the overall system. The classical outcome of this overall measurement is denoted y = (θ, c,θ,ĉ). This measurement is determined by an isometry U 1 and projection operators P 1,y that define an orthogonal measurement on the image of U 1 [6, 14] . We have that M 1,y = P 1,y U 1 is the collapse operator associated with the outcome y. We have Pr(X = y | Φ = φ) = 
If the protocol is correct, we can also assume that Pr(T 1 (Y ) = ok | Φ = φ 1 ) ≥ 1 − ǫ ′ where ǫ ′ = 1/25. Therefore, we obtain that Pr(T 1 (Y ) = ok | Φ = φ 0 ) ≥ 1 − ǫ ′ − 4 √ ǫ = 4/25. This concludes the proof that the BCJL protocol is insecure.
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